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Abstract: Vietnam, with a geographical proximity and a high volume of trade with China, was the
first country to record an outbreak of the new Coronavirus disease (COVID-19), caused by the Severe
Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 or SARS-CoV-2. While the country was expected to have
a high risk of transmission, as of April 4, 2020—in comparison to attempts to contain the disease
around the world—responses from Vietnam are being seen as prompt and effective in protecting the
interests of its citizens, with 239 confirmed cases and no fatalities. This study analyzes the situation
in terms of Vietnam’s policy response, social media and science journalism. A self-made web crawl
engine was used to scan and collect official media news related to COVID-19 between the beginning
of January and April 4, yielding a comprehensive dataset of 14,952 news items. The findings shed
light on how Vietnam—despite being under-resourced—has demonstrated political readiness to
combat the emerging pandemic since the earliest days. Timely communication on any developments
of the outbreak from the government and the media, combined with up-to-date research on the new
virus by the Vietnamese science community, have altogether provided reliable sources of information.
By emphasizing the need for immediate and genuine cooperation between government, civil society
and private individuals, the case study offers valuable lessons for other nations concerning not
only the concurrent fight against the COVID-19 pandemic but also the overall responses to a public
health crisis.
Keywords: coronavirus; COVID-19; SARS-CoV-2; pandemic; policy response; social media; science
journalism; public health system; Vietnam
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1. Introduction
“Dans les champs de l’observation le hasard ne favorise que les esprits préparés.”
—Louis Pasteur (1822–1895)
As China grappled to contain the outbreak of the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19), caused by the
virus officially named Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), in the first
few months of 2020, Vietnam, which shares a border of 1281 kilometers and a high volume of trade
with the northern giant [1], was bracing itself for a high risk of cross-border infections. Within more
than two months from January 23 when the first case of COVID-19 was detected in Vietnam, there
have been 239 confirmed cases with zero deaths [2]. During the same period, the number of infections
in China had skyrocketed from 600 people, with 17 deaths to 82,526 cases with 3330 deaths [3].
Despite the differences in their domestic contexts, such abysmal contrast between the two
neighbors could raise questions as to how Vietnam, a populous but less-resourced nation of nearly
100 million people, has managed to contain the spread of the new disease. This feat merits in-depth
studies, especially in light of the World Health Organization’s (WHO) declaration of COVID-19 as
a pandemic on March 11th [4] and the chaotic self-quarantine and lockdown in various countries in
Europe and America.
Vietnam was among the first countries to have confirmed cases of COVID-19, with the first
two patients (both Chinese) detected on January 23 [5]. This study identifies four periods of disease
outbreak in Vietnam, namely (i) pre-January 23, (ii) between January 23 and February 26 when the
first batch of sixteen patients were tested and treated till their discharge, (iii) between February 27 and
March 5 when there was no new case and (iv) and post-March 6 when the 17th patient was detected
and led a new wave of infections from incoming tourists and returning travelers [6].
As Figure 1 shows, compared to other countries, the infection rate in Vietnam was evidently much
lower than that in China, Italy, South Korea, the United Kingdom and the United States. All these
countries, except China, had the first cases announced in January [3]. In the period from January 23 to
February 25, the rise in cases in Vietnam was comparable to that in the United States, United Kingdom
and Germany. From late February to March 5, the situation in Vietnam appeared under control with no
new cases while cases in South Korea and Italy soared to 5766 and 3089, respectively [3]. From March
6 onward, the steep upward trend was seen in much of Europe and the United States, which as of
March 30 was ranked first with 122,653 cases [3].
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Figure 1. The rise of new Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) cases in selected countries (as of April
4, 2020). Note: [1] is the first case in Vietnam; [2] is when the patient 16 recovered, ended the 1st
outbreak; [3] is the 17th case in Vietnam, also the beginning of the 2nd phase of the outbreak.
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While Vietnam also saw an uptick in new cases during March, its response to COVID-19, which is
a combination of political readiness, timely communication and scientific journalism, offers valuable
lessons in dealing with situations of epidemics on a state level. As of April 4, the number of COVID-19
infections in Vietnam was 239, in which 90 patients had recovered, 149 are being treated and no deaths
recorded (See Figure 1).
The study, though in its preliminary and subject to changes as the disease progresses, may
nonetheless be instructive and helpful for other countries to better understand the role of policy
response, social media and science journalism in maintaining public health. The case of Vietnam
provides empirical evidence for assessing the efficacy of specific measures in fighting the pandemic.
2. Literature Review
Within the first three months of the new decade, the novel coronavirus, officially named
SARS-CoV-2—and the corresponding disease COVID-19—has spread from Wuhan city in China’s
central province of Hubei to 201 other countries and territories. Over 1,123,024 people have been
infected with over 59,140 lives lost as of April 4, 2020, according to the Global COVID-19 Tracker Map at
John Hopkins University [7]. The rapid contagion and severity of the new disease has prompted WHO
to update its statement, from classifying the outbreak as a “Public Health Emergency of International
Concern” on January 30 to a “Pandemic” on March 11 [4].
Given the urgency of this outbreak, the international academic community is mobilizing ways to
accelerate the development of disease detection and intervention. A statement by the research-charity
based Wellcome Trust in London has gathered more than 100 signatories to ensure access to data and
research findings on the disease could better inform the public and save lives. These include leading
publishers such as Springer Nature, Elsevier or Taylor and Francis as well as prestigious journals
such as The Journal of the American Medical Association, The British Medical Journal, the Lancet and New
England Journal of Medicine [8]. In these leading journals, editorials echoed a call for researchers to “keep
sharing, stay open” [9]. In Nature Medicine, the editorial also stated that “communication, collaboration
and cooperation can stop the 2019 coronavirus” [10]. Editors in the leading medical journal BMJ
asserted that “while scientists and public health professionals are working non-stop to contain the
novel coronavirus, political scientists, economists and sociologists should also ready themselves for
rapid response” [11].
Complementing the clinical research on COVID-19 are studies that integrate social sciences in the
outbreak response. Social sciences research is expected to produce rich and detailed insights into the
social, behavioral and contextual aspects of the communities, societies and populations affected by
infectious disease epidemics. The overarching aim is to bring together social sciences knowledge and
biomedical understanding of the COVID-19 epidemic. Such connection would strengthen the response
at international, regional, national and local levels to stop the spread of COVID-19 and mitigate its
social and economic impacts [12].
Among countries affected by the pandemic, Vietnam, with its geographical proximity with China, faces
a high likelihood of being severely affected by the spread of the disease. Moreover, although the Vietnamese
healthcare system is under-resourced and has inherent weaknesses [13–17], especially concerning health
insurance and patient welfare [17,18], the Vietnamese response to urgent situations has been commendable.
It is likely that the Vietnamese government has learnt from its experiences in the past, especially in dealing
with the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic in 2003. Vietnam’s success in the effective
control of SARS for the first time in the world was achieved by “complete isolation of patients and
implementation of nosocomial infection control from an early stage of epidemic” [19]. The lesson is clear
for Vietnam: early risk management requires taking adequate actions from the early stage of the disease.
The few studies on the outbreak in Vietnam have largely focused on the clinical aspects [20],
with the exception of [21], which is on public risk perception. This piece analyzes the government’s
response in terms of public health measures and policy implementation, as well as the mobilization of
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citizens’ collaboration in containing the disease have been very limited. This shall be a subtle call to
action for researchers in Vietnamese social sciences.
3. Materials and Methods
This paper reviews Vietnamese policy response, news and science journalisms related to COVID-19
recently. Findings were derived from the analysis of a database of recent policies, articles and the
credibility of data sources in Vietnam. Extensive coverage was given to the pandemic in both the
official press and academic journals as well as through reports, briefs and presentations by members of
concerned organizations (e.g., WHO).
A Python-powered web crawler engine was used to scan the data from online newspapers in
Vietnam, such as Tuổi Trẻ, Thanh Niên, VnExpress or Kênh 14, to name a few. Then, the scanned data
were saved into a news analysis system, which is developed by.NET Core, for storage and future
analysis. The data structure contains three main components:
• Projects & Data Sources: Settings for projects and news sources.
• Data Logging: Log of the data collection process
• News & Filters: Collected news with filters.
Examples of Python code are as follows (Figure 2):
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Using this system, we can set up sources and keywords. Furthermore, all tools and datasets will
be maintained for future mining. We expect the dataset to keep growing over time, presenting us with
ne opportunities to extract deeper and more valuable insights.
In this article, using five keywords related to COVID-19, namely: covid, ncov, corona, viem
phoi (Vietnamese for pneumonia, which has some symptoms in common with COVID-19), sars-cov,
between January 9 and April 4, the tool has collected 14,952 news reports on the topic of concern,
as presented in Table 1.
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Table 1. List of online news sources (as of April 4, 2020).
Sources Start Date News
kenh14.vn 15/01/2020 2132
vtc.vn 17/01/2020 909
suckhoedoisong.vn 09/01/2020 929
cafef.vn 12/01/2020 804
tuoitre.vn 12/01/2020 1196
chinhphu.vn 09/01/2020 441
Zing.vn 17/01/2020 1360
dantri.com.vn 10/02/2020 1838
plo.vn 23/01/2020 400
vnexpress.net 23/01/2020 917
vov.vn 27/02/2020 1748
nld.vn 28/02/2020 577
rfa.org 10/02/2020 248
thanhnien.vn 18/02/2020 1453
Raw data were manually cleaned then categorized based on its characteristics, such as the timeline
of COVID-19 cases, the timeline of international events regarding COVID-19, media reports and
policy response from the Vietnamese government. Regarding the social media aspect, due to technical
limitations, we could not scan information from Facebook. Thus, we used the remediation of social
media on news outlets as a proxy to explore the social media aspect. Keywords that uniquely fit
with the aspect, including ‘mạng xã hội’ (social media), ‘cư dân mạng’ (netizens), Facebook and Zalo,
were used to search within the collected dataset. Furthermore, the data of the VN INDEX, which
represents the changes in the Vietnamese stock market’s prices during the COVID-19 pandemic, was
also added to complete the dataset. Finally, we store the cleaned data as a comprehensive dataset in
excel files.
The dataset (updated as of April 4, 2020) is available at Open Science Framework (OSF) (URL: https:
//osf.io/4w9ef/; DOI: 10.17605/OSF.IO/4W9EF) [22]. Having organized the dataset, we then calculated
descriptive statistics to illustrate how the Vietnamese government, news and science journalism
respond to COVID-19.
4. Results
4.1. Chronology
Figure 3 presents a timeline of the spread of COVID-19 in Vietnam, tracing from the first identified
patient in on January 23 to the most recent case on March 31. At this time, the number of cases in
Vietnam exceeded 200 and for the sake of better presentation of data, we decided to cut off the data on
this day. The most updated version of the chronology as well other data can be accessed from OSF [22].
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Based on this timeline, four main periods of the COVID-19 outbreak in Vietnam are identified in
Table 2.
Table 2. Four periods of the COVID-19 outbreak in Vietnam.
Period Date Event
1 Before January 23 No confirmed case in Vietnam
2 January 23–February 26 First confirmed case in Vietnam–16th infected casedischarged from hospital (Figure 4)
3 February 27–March 5 No new case in Vietnam
4 March 6–present [April 4] 17th infected case confirmed and more reported afterward
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4.2. Policy Response
We have manually extracted news reports regarding the government’s actions following the
outbreak. We have identified 173 official instructions, guidelines, plans, dispatch, policies and direct
actions from the government, which were categorized as follows (Table 3):
Table 3. Categories of Vietnamese government policy response.
Category Count Enacted in
Fake news prevention 10 Periods 2,4
Assessment of the prevention 5 Periods 1,2
Assessment of the threat 4 Periods 1,2
Education 15 Periods 2,3,4
Emergency response 30 Periods 2,4
Guidelines and plans 10 Periods 1–4
Innovation 1 Period 3
Market control 18 Periods 2,3,4
National funding 1 Period 4
National Pandemic announcement 1 Period 4
Outbreak-is-over announcement 1 Period 2
Preventive action 35 Periods 2,3,4
Reward 1 Period 1
Social distancing announcement 1 Period 4
Citizen support 16 Period 2,4
Travel restrictions 24 Periods 2,3,4
4.2.1. Period 1: Before January 23, 2020
In this period before the first case was confirmed, the policy response focused on the assessment
of the threat, together with developing guidelines and plans as preventive measures for the coming
combat for the newly detected disease. As early as January 3, even before the first fatal case in China [12]
and only a few days after China confirmed the outbreak of a new coronavirus [23], the Ministry of
Health (MOH) had issued a directive on tightening quarantine at the Vietnam-China border [24].
On January 10, the Public Health Emergency Operation Center under the MOH followed up with a
meeting to evaluate the disease situation and suggest preventive and treatment measures.
From January 16 to 20, the MOH issued two decisions (No. 125/QĐ-BYT and No. 156/QĐ-BYT)
to provide guidelines and plans to prevent spread of the new coronavirus [25]. One urgent official
dispatch (62/KCB-NV) to hospitals and local health departments stresses the importance of early
disease prevention and detection [26].
4.2.2. Period 2: January 23, 2020–February 26, 2020
After the first confirmed case of COVID-19 infection, the policies focused both on minimizing
risks from inbound travelers and containing the disease domestically. The policies include emergency
responses, preventive actions, travel restrictions and market control.
During this period, because the hotspot of the disease was in China, attempts to control the spread
from other countries focused on China-originated sources of infection. Vietnam started with strict
screening on passengers from China at airports, seaports and land crossings, followed with isolating
passengers suspected of infection, and entirely restricting flights to Wuhan and other affected areas in
China [27]. On February 3 when the number of cases in China had shot up to 20,400, the Vietnamese
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government heightened quarantine to cover all travelers who have come from or transited through
the COVID-19 affected areas in China [28]. In the last days of the period, with Daegu, South Korea
becoming the latest COVID-19 hotspot, the MOH added health declaration for all passengers from or
transiting through South Korea and imposed isolation for those with symptoms [29].
At the same time, a series of emergency responses and preventive actions were made from the
central to local governments. These included calls for increased cooperation among localities as well
as specific tasks for multiple ministries and agencies [30,31]. With Deputy Prime Minister Vu Duc
Dam appointed as the head of the steering committee for COVID-19 combat, intra-governmental
cooperation is formalized and government officials are held to the highest accountability.
When the sixth COVID-19 case—also the first case of domestic transmission—was confirmed
on February 1, the government declared the epidemic of a new coronavirus-caused infectious
disease in Vietnam [32]. What followed were strict measures to prevent the virus from spreading,
including quarantine, isolation of suspected virus carriers and voluntary isolation at the community [30].
This period was marked by a 20-day lockdown of a commune of 10,600 people in the northern province
of Vinh Phuc after ten people tested positive to the new virus [33].
In response to potential public hoarding of certain goods, from February 1, the government had
worked with relevant authorities to inspect pharmacies nationwide and withdraw business licenses of
those which increased prices of face masks, hand sanitizers and medical gloves [34]. Within three days,
more than 1200 drug stores were penalized and over 313,000 face masks were seized [35].
Another action taken by the government was the introduction of technological platforms, including
the website http://ncov.moh.gov.vn and the NCOVI and Vietnam Health apps, to provide updated
information about the epidemic, including testing data, advice on precautionary measures and live
chat for questions related to COVID-19 [36].
However, there were two mistakes during this period. In the first case, the Vietnam National
Administration of Tourism had attempted to promote a campaign called “Vietnam—Safe Haven”
while the spread of COVID-19 was still at the early stage [37]. The campaign aimed to attract foreign
tourists on the ground that Vietnam has managed this public health crisis well; consequently, 41% of
the COVID-19 cases since patient 17—effectively a “patient zero” of the second cluster of the outbreak
in Vietnam—are foreign tourists [38].
In the second case, the Ministry of Education and Training (MOET) had made three significant
mistakes when school shutdowns began [39]. First, given the uncertain nature of the pandemic, it was
a bad decision to close schools for one week at a time and then extend such shutdown week-by-week,
leaving students and parents hanging every week and burdening their household decision-making.
Second, because the ministry failed to provide educational guidelines timely, a longer break right after
the Vietnamese national Tet holidays left the false impression of an extended vacation for families.
This meant many families take the weeks off to travel, instead of staying home to minimize exposure
and transmission. Third, the ministry’s decisions on which groups of students (i.e., elementary and
secondary) stay home and what universities should do (i.e., self-determination) were erratic and
lacking scientific basis. When no age group has been proven “safe” from virus transmission, and young
people could be asymptomatic carriers of the virus, letting them back to school could turn them into
transmission vectors and threatened immunocompromised members of their own family, such as
grandparents. Only after protest from the public did the ministry decree all school buildings to be shut
down and all students to stay home.
Despite these few blunders, all confirmed cases were discharged from hospitals at the end of this
period. Deputy Prime Minister Vu Duc Dam had declared that Vietnam “won the first battle against
the epidemic” [40].
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4.2.3. Period 3: February 27, 2020–March 5, 2020
Between February 26 and March 4, with no new patients detected, Vietnam entered a pause in the
timeline of the outbreak. By contrast, the world, from Asia to Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa,
was seeing a rapid spread of the disease [41,42], with two new coronavirus hotspots emerging outside
China. As of March 5, the number of infected patients in South Korea had hit 6284 and in Italy 3858 [3].
The pause in Vietnam, however, does not mean any changes to existing disease prevention and
control policies. The government continued to impose stricter travel restrictions, such as halting
visa exemption for citizens of severely affected countries, including South Korea and Italy, and ask
schools and universities nationwide to keep closing. Pandemic combat remains a top priority. An army
simulation exercise in response to the outbreak was held on March 4.
Yet, there were signs of imprudence. Deputy Prime Minister Vu Duc Dam, the leader of Vietnam
National Steering Committee for COVID-19, had hastily announced on March 4 that: “If another week
passes without new cases, Vietnam will announce the end of the epidemic” [43]. This leads to lax
regulations among frontline guards against the disease and may have contributed to the outbreak after
case 17.
4.2.4. Period 4: March 6, 2020–Current
After 22 days of having no new confirmed case of COVID-19, on March 6, the 17th patient was
confirmed. This marked the second outbreak of Vietnam with the source of infection evaluated as much
more complicated rather than just China or Korea (See Figure 5). The new cases in this period were
mainly tourists and Vietnamese citizens coming back from European countries as well as people who
had direct contact with the infected patients. On March 30, as the number of cases climbed every day,
the Prime Minister declared the COVID-19 outbreak as a nationwide pandemic [44]. This declaration
heightened alert over disease prevention, especially following the first cases of cross-infection to
healthcare workers from a cluster at a tier-one hospital in Hanoi. As of March 31, there were 34 infected
cases related to Bach Mai Hospital [45].
In response, the Vietnamese government imposed many rigorous measures [46], including a
temporary suspension of visa issuance to all foreigners for 30 days effective on March 18 [47],
obligated 14-day quarantine at centralized facilities from March 21 and ultimately, temporary suspension
of entry to all foreigners on March 22 [48] (See Table 4).
Table 4. The halting of visa issuance to foreign countries.
Country Date Issued Number of Cases in Vietnam(as of the announcement)
All countries March 18 66
The United Kingdom and Schengen March 15 53
Italy March 3 17
South Korea February 29 16
China February 2 7
At the domestic level, the government has implemented urgent measures in multiple domains.
All schools have closed across the country and are likely expected to stay closed for a long period
of time [49]. Large-scale quarantine and isolation of suspected cases persisted; and self-isolation for
people with high risks of infection was carried out. All religious organizations are asked to stop
holding mass gatherings from March 21 while all cultural, sports and entertainment activities in
public places are prohibited from March 28 to April 15 [50,51]. The biggest change yet is, effective
April 1, Vietnam enforced a “15-day nationwide social distancing” in which every household, village,
commune, district and province would go into self-isolation [52]. Meanwhile, incoming flights to
Vietnam are halted, while traveling within the country has also been restricted [53].
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Hong Ngoc and Saint Pa l, used to be suspended or have a number of healthcare workers quarantined
because of direct contact with COVID-19 patients without proper prevention measures. After these
incidents, the city’s authorities asked all medical centers to learn from these experiences and Hanoi
Department of Health to conduct more effective training for healthcare workers as well as monitoring
the process of taking care of infected patients to prevent the outbreak within hospitals [57]. In the
second outbreak, the Vietnamese policy response related to hospitality management focused on Bach
Mai Hospital as the biggest COVID-19 cluster in the country [58]. On March 28, Bach Mai hospital,
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which is Hanoi’s largest leading hospital, was completely blocked after twelve infected cases related to
this medical center were confirmed. More than 5000 health care workers, patients and food workers in
the hospital were tested for the virus and another 40,000 people who were at the hospital have been
tracked down and asked to self-quarantine at home for 14 days [59]. During that night, a temporary
hospital was set up within Bach Mai hospital to prepare for the worst scenario. However, two days
later, the Ministry of Health announced that Bach Mai hospital cannot stop receiving and curing
patients with serious and complex medical conditions from provincial hospitals, 80% of whom may
lose their lives without proper treatment [60].
Overall, amid COVID-19 outbreak, the hospital management policies imposed by the government
have been well followed by all-level hospitals—and as an encouragement—Prime Minister Nguyen
Xuan Phuc acknowledged and praised the contribution of “soldiers in white blouse” in a letter sent to
frontline doctors and nurses on March 26 [61].
Regarding economic activities, to assure the public over supply of essential goods, following the
short panic-buying of Hanoi citizens when the 17th case was detected, officials across the country
immediately worked with suppliers and distributors [62–64]. After the declaration of the nationwide
social distancing on March 31, the government made sure to reassure people of the maintained
transportation network for essential goods, especially food.
In addition, the State Bank of Vietnam, the country’s central bank, on March 12 drafted a circular
which would support credit organizations to restructure debt payment deadlines and cut borrowing
interest rate and exemption for enterprises heavily affected by the pandemic. It was stated that
over 44,000 customers with a total debt of VND222 trillion (US$9.51 billion) would benefit from this
program [65]. Furthermore, on March 31, the government has discussed a welfare measure according
to which all poor households would receive an aid of 1,000,000 VND per person per month [66].
In terms of technological application, the Vietnamese government opened a system to record
electronic health declaration form for overseas travelers entering the country for the purpose of case
monitoring and surveillance [67]. In addition, the Hanoi Smart City app was also activated to provide
a risk assessment tool, consultation on prevention measurements, contact reports and live updates for
Hanoi citizens [68].
The prompt and effective measures undertaken by the Vietnamese government to date have
been highly regarded by international organizations [69]. Domestically, the results from global public
research focusing on people’s perception of their government’s reaction by Dalia Research revealed
that Vietnamese people have the most confidence in their government’s response to the COVID-19
pandemic among 45 countries surveyed [70]. About 62% of the Vietnamese respondents think that the
government is doing the “right amount’ in response to the situation [71].
4.3. Media Communication
4.3.1. Official Press
Prior to the first case of COVID-19 in Vietnam, news on a “strange pneumonia” in China had
circulated on Vietnamese media as early as the beginning of January 2020. Our dataset suggests
news regarding this “strange pneumonia” first appeared on Báo Chính phủ (chinhphu.vn), Vietnam
Government Portal and Sức Khỏe và Đời Sống [Health and Life] (suckhoedoisong.vn), the official news
channel of the Ministry of Health, on January 9 [72,73].
According to the article written by the Public Health Emergency Operation Center on Sức Khỏe và
Đời Sống [73], public health experts expected high risk of having an outbreak in Vietnam because it was
near the Tet holidays (or Chinese New Year). The following preventive measures had been proposed:
• Monitoring information from WHO and other sources
• Communicating the information clearly to the citizen
• Increasing disease surveillance at the border
Sustainability 2020, 12, 2931 13 of 27
• Maintaining the alertness of the Public Health Emergency Operation Center and four Institutes of
Hygiene and Epidemiology.
• Planning prevention and control measures.
It should be noted that other news outlets such as Tuổi Trẻ, Thanh Niên or Quân Đội Nhân Dân
even shared the information to public earlier, from as early as January 3 [74,75]. Thus, the timely
attention from newspapers and news media and afterward, social media, has played a crucial role in
disseminating information to the public.
Since then, thousands of articles have been written updating Vietnamese people about the outbreak
in the country and globally. Data from 14 online newspapers only generated nearly 15,000 articles
published from January 9 to April 4. This helps considerably in raising public awareness about the
disease as well as informing people on disease prevention and protection.
As can be seen from Figure 6, the amount of media communication to the public remained high at
around 150 to 190 articles daily. However, there were days when newspapers appeared to pay attention
to other events, and this number of articles dropped to below 100 in the third period. Overall, the flow
of news and information to the public was on-going and rather substantial during the outbreaks.
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4.3.2. Social Media
One particular characteristic of social media in Vietnam is the widespread use of Facebook
(57.34% of the o latio [76]) and the local a p Zalo (100 million users) [77]. These social
media channels provide additional room for the government, particularly the Ministry of Health,
to communicate coronavirus-related information to its citizens in a timely ma ner.
As Figure 7 suggests, the number of articles, including keywords such as Facebook or ‘mạng xã hội’
(social media) in major Vietnamese newspapers is high. As the information has been disseminated through
social edia on an hourly basis, as well as the update from influencers or reporters, the newspapers had
to remediate these contents. In the first an fourt periods, as ma y as 50 to 60 articles were circulated i
each period. Meanwhile, ‘Zalo’ and ‘cư dân mạng’ (netizen) received less attention.
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During the fourth period, information density proved to be an essential aspect of dealing with
pandemic. There exists a stereotype of students and expatriates coming back from developed countries
as being more informed and better behaved given their higher level of education. However, recent events
have shown that stereotypes remain stereotypes. Patient 17 in Vietnam is a notable illustration: a
well-educated upper-middle-class person who acted in an extremely ignorant manner, refused to
self-quarantine for 14 days, and thus had likely spread the virus to many other cases afterward.
Media communication created both positive and negative impacts on public awareness and
attention during this period. On the one hand, individual effort in supporting public awareness and
protection against the virus was praised by social media. For example, Vietnamese dancer Quang Dang
with the handwashing song, known as “Ghen Co Vy,” went viral globally and attracted thousands of
views, and many people around the world are posting their own covers [78]. Some Youtubers with
a large number of subscribers have also contributed interesting and diverse perspectives about the
pandemic, for instance the 16-year-old YouTuber named Melly Vuong [79]. In quarantine areas, people
update about their life on social media, which spread a positive review of the facilities and healthcare
system. For example, the well-known local fashionista Chau Bui made videos of her quarantine period,
all of which amassed nearly one million views [80]. Famous artists are reported on social media for
their donations to the healthcare facilities in Vietnam [81]. Social media also reacted vividly to cases of
confirmed patients or quarantined people. For example, Patient 17, who returned from Europe and
did not provide accurate health status declaration, got serious criticism from social media.
However, the negative side of rapid social media response is a strong emergence of fake news.
The problem was most acute during the early days of critical events such as the confirmed case of the
first or 17th patient with the involvement of celebrities and famous people. Responses to combat such
mis/dis-information were made in both periods 2 and 4 (Table 3), formalized in a government decree in
which anyone spreading fake news could be fined between (US$430-860), around 3–6 months’ worth
of basic salary in Vietnam [81].
4.3.3. Science Journalism
In the fight against coronavirus, science journalism plays a crucial role in informing the global
research community as well as providing reliable information to the public. Vietnamese hospitals have
contributed very promptly to the call for sharing knowledge and data about the disease [38] on January
28th, 2020, even before the call from Nature editors to all COVID-19 researchers [10]. Since then, there
have been several significant works contributed by Vietnamese authors to the scientific community
(see Table 5).
These efforts of Vietnamese scientists were also reported on the official press, for example,
Vnexpress on January 30th posted an article entitled, “The first case of nCoV in Vietnam on the world’s
“medical bible”” [82], introducing the work by [38].
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Table 5. Articles about COVID-19 published by Vietnamese authors.
No. Title Authors Journal/Source Date
1
Importation and
Human-to-Human
Transmission of a
Novel Coronavirus in
Vietnam
Phan, Lan T., Nguyen, Thuong V.,
Luong, Quang C., Nguyen, Thinh V.
Nguyen, Hieu T., Le, Hung Q.,
Nguyen, Thuc T., Cao, Thang M.
Pham, Quang D.
The New
England
Journal of
Medicine
January 28,
2020
2
Outbreak investigation
for COVID-19 in
northern Vietnam
Hai Nguyen Thanh, Truong
Nguyen Van, Huong Ngo Thi Thu,
Binh Nghiem Van, Binh Doan
Thanh, Ha Phung Thi Thu,
The Lancet
Infectious
Diseases
March 4, 2020
3
Duration of viral
detection in throat and
rectum of a patient
with COVID-19
Le Van Tan, Nghiem My Ngoc, Bui
Thi Ton That, Le Thi Tam Uyen,
Nguyen Thi Thu Hong, Nguyen Thi
Phuong Dung, Le Nguyen Truc
Nhu, Tran Tan Thanh, Dinh Nguyen
Huy Man, Nguyen Thanh Phong,
Tran Tinh Hien, Nguyen Thanh
Truong, Guy Thwaites, Nguyen Van
Vinh Chau
medRxiv March 16,2020
4
The COVID-19 risk
perception: A survey
on socioeconomics and
media attention
Toan Luu Duc Huynh EconomicsBulletin
March 25,
2020
Regarding initiatives of science journalism, the use of preprints to speed up the publishing process
has been a focus in the combat against COVID-19 [83,84], for example [20]. This shows the positive
signal of the Vietnamese scientific community to move forward with these global trends. The findings
from Vietnamese hospitals and authors can, therefore, contribute to the database of global knowledge
and expertise and may help to curtail this outbreak and prepare for future outbreaks.
On April 3, one of the leading universities in Vietnam, the National Economic University, also
released a report titled “Assessment of COVID-19 impacts on the economy and policy recommendations,”
which has been heavily covered on the media [85]. Therefore, it appeared that researchers from hospitals
and universities, rather than other types of institutions, have published more on COVID-19. This is
consistent with the findings from [86] that university-affiliated authors in Vietnam tend to have higher
research productivity than institution-affiliated peers.
Additionally, scientific publications and information also play a critical role in debunking myths
on the disease and quickly communicating reliable information to the public, for instance, pushing
back against a steady stream of rumors and conspiracy theories about the origin of the coronavirus
outbreak [87]. This source may be used by newspapers and social media to disseminate information
more widely to the general public (for example [88]). In Vietnam, various scientists have frequently
updated scientific knowledge and perspectives on their personal Facebook accounts to inform the
community. For instance, the Facebook posts by Tran Xuan Bach—an Associate Professor of John
Hopkins University based in Hanoi—had attracted nearly 13,000 views and hundreds of shares from
the public [89]. Furthermore, interviews with doctors and scientists were also conducted both in
written form and in live form, for example, the live consultation session on the topic “Information
about Coronavirus and respiratory diseases—How to prevent and treat” broadcasted on VTV News
Newspaper [90].
In terms of scientific advancement, Vietnam has successfully produced test kits to diagnose
COVID-19 infection in just one hour. The kit was stated to meet the WHO and the U.S. Center for
Disease Control and Prevention Standards, and 20 countries were negotiating to buy these products [91].
Besides this, several scientific projects are being conducted to produce similar rapid testing kits to meet
the increasing demand worldwide, for example, those by Hanoi University of Science and Technology
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or Vietnam Academy of Science and Technology [91]. On March 3, the Vietnam Academy of Science
and Technology officially announced the successful manufacturing of SARS-CoV-2 Virus Diagnostic
Kit [92].
Besides scientific publications, university websites and various information-sharing magazines
also contributed to enhancing the awareness of COVID-19. For instance, Phenikaa University has
posted instructions to prevent the coronavirus up-to-date and donated more than 8000 liters of hand
sanitizer to residential areas, Hanoi Youth Union, Departments of Education and hundreds of schools
in Vietnam Northern provinces [93]. Similarly, more than 20 universities across the country have
produced sanitizers and provided them free for their communities [94].
On March 31, 10 COVID-19 testing kiosks have been set up all around Hanoi, prioritizing the areas
around Bach Mai hospital which was one of the largest recent outbreak hotspot [95]. Five thousand
quick test kits—which give results after 10 minutes of testing—were distributed by the Ministry of
Health to these testing kiosks, and were ready immediately on March 31st morning [96]. This is an
important development, as Vietnam has so far relied on suboptimal methods such as self-report via
declaration of medical status and targeting high-risk populations. Mass testing is a proactive measure
that aims to directly inspect the entire population, leading to early detection and thus minimizing
spread [97]. This was a lesson explicitly learned from South Korea, as not only the test kits were
Korean-developed but the help of Korean experts was also enlisted in implementing mass testing
in Vietnam. The importance of cross-border lesson learning underlines the significance of science
journalism, especially when disease containment has to be coordinated on an international level.
4.3.4. Socioeconomic Aspects
While imposing strict directives to prevent the dissemination of the novel coronavirus,
adverse impacts on the socio-economic situations in Vietnam are observable as consequences. For
instance, the number of international visitors to Vietnam in the first three months of 2020 was expected
to decline by 800,000 compared to last year [98]. However, as stated by Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan
Phuc: “the government is willing to sacrifice economic benefits in the short term for the health of
people,” Vietnam government acknowledges the adverse consequences of preventive measures. The
acknowledgment is also reflected through the simultaneous reduction of interest rate by the State Bank
of Vietnam [99].
In the economic domain, for the stock market (Figure 8), before the detection of the first COVID-19
case in Vietnam, in period 1, the information for the disease in China appeared to have little impact on
the market. During period 2, from January 23 to February 26, the market started the downward trend
and lost more than 6.6%, from 959.58 points to 895.97 points. In period 3, the VN-Index experienced a
minimal decrease from 895.97 on February 26 to 893.31 on March 5, 2020. During period 4, between
confirmation of the 17th case in Vietnam on March 6 and the 207th case on March 31, the stock
market suffered severely, with its benchmark VN-Index recording a sharp loss of nearly 229 points,
or 25.7%.The weak market sentiment and force-sell pressure in Vietnam are predicted to persist, given
the complicated developments in stock markets around the world.
While Vietnam is no longer a centrally planned economy [100,101], in the face of a public health
crisis and national emergency as this one, the government was quick to control any sudden spikes in
prices of consumer goods, and thus, effectively preventing price speculation and gouging. In the very
first day of Period 4 of COVID-19 detection and intervention in Vietnam, there was an initial wave of
panic stockpiling of food among local consumers [102]. However, within two days, the government
met and discussed measures not only to cope with the disease outbreak but also to stabilize the
domestic market [103]. By comparison, elsewhere around the globe, even in developed nations such as
Australia [104] and the United States [105], consumers were reported to hoard a massive amount of
food, toilet papers, hand sanitizer and anti-bacterial wipes; some were doing it so as to profit off the
public’s panic buying. While there is insufficient data for comparing prices before and after the outbreak
among countries, it appears that the situation in Vietnam is kept relatively better under control than in
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other countries. This is evidenced by the fact that the government, in conjunction with producers and
supermarkets, was prompt to assure the public of food security as well as price stabilization.
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In the social domain, during the early days after the first infected case, there had been rumors
that the V etnamese government was hiding information about the novel coronavirus, which caused
some co fusion and ins curity for t e public [106]. To respond to this inf rma i n, the authorities and
mainstream media promptly reassured the citizens that transparency is the fundamental principle of
the country in preventing the spread of the virus [107]. Government officials further explained that
data and information from four Public Health Emergency Operation Centers of Vietnam were directly
connected to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention USA and, therefore, shared openly to the
global database [107].
In the later periods, the emergence of strong political leaders such as Deputy Prime Minister Vu
Duc Dam had a significant and positive influence on public perception of the Vietnamese government
as well as the consensus and trust in Vietnam’s efforts to fight against the pandemic. On social media,
images and quotes of Deputy PM Dam appeared extensively on citizen’s posts, which created a sense of
solidarity and the belief in governments’ efforts. Recently, the call from Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan
Phuc on the whole nation’s joint efforts in COVID-19 combat attracted public attention and support
from individual citizens [108]. Responding to this call, one can easily see many images of bank transfer
to the Vietnamese Fatherland Front on social media of Vietnamese people to support the government
in the combat. On a larger scale, many enterprises, regardless of their size, also contributed to the
national combat by donating their products such as masks, rice or milk, by donating their hotels for
isolation wards—or most popularly—by donating cash [109].
The social response can also be seen from various groups, including residential, work-related
and informal groups. Since the early days of the outbreak, residential groups played a central role in
transferring information to individual citizens by means of public announcements, leaflets, posters or
standees [110]. In big cities, apartment buildings as well as office buildings took measures to prevent
the spread of the virus, for instance by sanitizing the whole building or checking people’s temperatures
before entering together with putting sanitizers in public spaces [111]. In daily transactions such as
food shipping (see Figure 9), safety measures are being enforced by citizens. The image, once again,
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reminds old people of how daily transactions were secretly conducted in the centrally planned economy
period. In the digital space, multiple groups have been formed, especially on social media, to share
information about the pandemic and collaborate efforts to help fight against it.
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gradually distilling information also contributed to the fact that most of the time, t e people responded
to the situation without panicking. In addition, in the Viet amese culture characterized by adoption of
new ideas [112], the act of wearing masks has been seen as normal and as a way to protect oneself,
not as a source of risks and infection for surrounding people as in some countries. Therefore, the habit
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the above sections, the government had been sensible enough to perceive warnings and recognize
said mistakes.
The early policy response for preventive and treatment measures before the first case appearing
in Vietnam is a highlight because Vietnam obtains a comparatively long shared borderline with China,
and that was during the Tet holiday—the traditional new year of both Vietnam and China when the
mobility rate was substantially high. The later simultaneous responses of the government presented
through continuous directives of the Prime Minister according to the COVID-19 situation provide
public health measures (school closure, public health quarantine, social distancing, etc.) and maintain
the supply of fundamental goods for preventing the dissemination of the disease. Besides that, the
effective control of the infected case number is also greatly influenced by the fluent coordination
among governmental agencies. To achieve smooth national coordination during the harsh time, a
whole-of-government pandemic prevention drill was held during the period when no newly infected
cases were found. These efforts of Vietnam all met the suggestions by WHO for responding to
community spread of COVID-19 [113] and implied the high awareness and integration of Vietnam
government, which are two out of five main factors of a resilient health system proposed by [114].
Indeed, the government learned from its previous experience during the SARS 2003 epidemic and
established a public health response mechanism that has proven to be effective to date.
Despite the optimistic results of the measures that have been taken to prevent the spread of
COVID-19, one must not deny the mistake that may have intensified the severe consequences of the
second outbreak. The Ministry of Education and Training was responsible for lack of guidelines for
students as well as indecisive policies regarding school shutdowns during the early phases of the
pandemic. The Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism had also taken missteps in underestimating
the spread of the diseases and falling lax in controlling cross-borders contamination. It highlights a
certain disconnect between the declaration of the PM to prioritize the health of citizens above economic
concerns: indeed, the Ministry had thought to take advantage of a global pandemic to promote tourism,
and Vietnam had paid dearly.
As has been suggested by Leach, et al. [115], governments often preferred to frame disease outbreaks
as acute, thus relying on temporary, short-term measures of public intervention; an alternative to
this framing would be to consider infectious diseases as endemic and long-present in the locality,
thus adapting the entire community’s lifestyle to deal with it. As COVID-19 is a novel disease,
the Vietnamese government has indeed responded to it as an epidemic outbreak; however, it could also
be observed that the rapid response itself owed to the fact that Vietnam had had a history of dealing
with epidemics and pandemics, namely SARS in 2003 and H5N1 flu in 2008; as well as A/H1N1 in
2009, the disease continued to make its reappearance in smaller outbreaks in years to come, such as in
2018 [116]. For this reason, one may be able to have a positive outlook on Vietnam’s sustainability,
at least in terms of efficient decision-making, in the continuing battle against the spread of COVID-19.
Sustainability in terms of resources, however, merited a closer look. In view of the phenomenon
of pre-lockdown panic-buying, particularly reported in the United States, but also in certain other
countries such as France or Germany, food insecurity and commodity shortage have become legitimate
concerns. In certain circles on social media, certain pictures of Vietnam and the US have been posted
alongside to highlight the contrast between the quite adequate food distribution in Vietnam as well as
the free meals provided in quarantine hospitals on one hand, and the empty shelves of not only food
but also sanitary products (toilet rolls, hand sanitizer, soap, etc.) due to hoarding in certain places
in the United States on the other. In addition, one could not discuss resource drainage in the face of
a pandemic without evoking labor. It goes without saying that the medical personnel was on the
frontline, but other than medical professions, it should be noted that manual laborers who uphold the
infrastructure, such as store staff, garbage collectors, deliverers, etc. This aspect of resource merits as
much attention from governments and planning as any other.
With regard to resources required to sustain prevention measures, there are positive signs. it is
worth noting that Vietnam is efficient enough in the production of test kits for both domestic use
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and export deals. This would be comparable to South Korea’s testing ability, which had been put to
use with remarkable success in curbing the spread of the disease as the country became the world’s
second-largest outbreak. [117]. However, as the second outbreak continued to spread, the efficiency
of current preventive methods grew questionable. The demand for capable healthcare infrastructure
to accommodate new cases thus remained pressing. Considering the fact that Vietnamese central
hospitals suffered from chronic overpopulation in yearly minor outbreaks, this issue should very much
concern policymakers. A suggestion would be to immediately devise plans to restrict mobility between
provinces—both to prevent disease spread and to avoid overloading central hospitals—as well as to
upgrade and equip regional hospitals and encourage infected citizens to utilize medical facilities in
their proximity.
Concerning communication and information dissemination in the face of the pandemic, we have
observed a pattern in the official press. Journalists have indeed picked up on the vocabulary used
by officials in public speeches. As such, articles reporting on measures against COVID-19 employed
rhetoric often associated to wars, such as: “fight the enemy” (đánh giặc, in which the word giặc connotes
the illegitimacy of said enemy, a nuance difficult to translate), “leave nobody behind” (không bỏ lại ai
phía sau; as if in a battle march), “grand solidarity” (đại đoàn kết, alluding to the two Indochina wars
against France and the US), etc. This sort of highly combative language was, in fact, not new, as it has
been used in official narratives for a good number of national media campaigns. On the other hand,
technical terminologies seemed to be much less abundant in Vietnamese media reports.
Influential political leaders and experienced teams of officials were quick to recognize the crisis
and implemented rigorous strategies to address the emerging outbreak. The media response has also
helped in promoting public awareness about the disease and how people can protect themselves and
the communities around them. Science journalism equally played a crucial role in communicating
effectively and prompt information to the public and global research communities.
The three pillars of society’s responses have contributed majorly to the situation of Vietnam,
in which the community has responded quickly to a crisis and protect the interests of its citizens. It also
reveals valuable lessons for other nations in the concurrent fight against the COVID-19 pandemic,
namely an emphasis on mobilizing citizens’ awareness of disease prevention without spreading panic,
via fostering genuine cooperation between government, civil society and private individuals.
6. Limitations of the Study and Future Research Directions
We fully acknowledge the shortcomings of this paper. As the pandemic is still spreading and the
situation continues to move rapidly at the time of writing, we are faced with a shortage of backing in the
extant literature. While we have tried our best with rigorous methodology and technical tools—namely,
using a web crawler to gather data en masse from news sites—there remain certain arbitrary choices
that we had had to make as researchers, such as the choice of which news sites to consider, and which
to exclude, from our analysis.
In terms of data curation and flexibility of analysis, our methodology also shows several limitations.
It should be noted that news articles on online news sites were quite often reposted from one location
to another, thus inflating the number of articles reporting on COVID-19 compared to the substantial
information being disseminated. Rather than an error, we believe this phenomenon of media
communication to be interesting in itself. However, we do not believe ourselves to be sufficiently
equipped for analysis thereof, nor do we believe such an analysis would fit within the scope of our
article. We would welcome any contribution, related or not to this point.
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